文獻閱讀

Brandon Song Li Lv4
  2019-10-06 21:40 2019-10-06 21:40 撰寫   2023-08-28 23:03 2023-08-28 23:03 更新    

文獻閱讀記錄

2023

  • 2023.08.25: Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.

2022

  1. Brito B. Paulo. Ch1-Malthusian. --2022-01-04.
  2. Hallam Arne. Functional Forms for Consumer Theory. --2022-01-04
  3. 高华：《红太阳是怎样升起的——延安整风运动的来龙去脉》，香港中文大学出版社。–2022-01-06
  4. GROSSMAN, Gene M., et al. Balanced growth despite Uzawa. American Economic Review, 2017, 107.4: 1293-1312. 包括 online appendix–2021-01-06
  5. SASAKURA, By Kazuyuki. How Uzawa differs from Lucas. Oxford Economic Papers, 2021. --2022-01-07
  6. XIE, Danyang. Divergence in Economic Performance: Transitional Dynamics with Multiple Equilibria. 1993. --2022-01-08
  7. PICAULT, Julien, et al. Inconsistencies in Textbook Presentation of Substitution and Income Effects. International Journal of Teaching and Education, 2016, 4.3: 7-15. --2022-01-08
  8. AUTOR, David. Topic 2: The Canonical Model of Skill in 14.662 (2018) Graduate Labor Economics II. --2022-01-13
  9. Brito, Paulo. Modern Growth Ch9-11. --2022-01-18
  10. AUTOR, David. Topic 3: Educational Production and Wage Structure in 14.662 (2018) Graduate Labor Economics II. --2022-01-18
  11. 趙紫陽，《改革歷程》，香港：新世紀出版社。–2022-01-25
  12. 《蓝风筝》 13. Pichler, P. and Sorger, 2006, G. Markov Perfect Equilibria in the Ramsey Model. --2022-03-10
  13. Brito, Paul. Modern Growth (All) 其中8.2、8.3、8.4需要重讀。–2022-02-10
  14. 方舟与中国，2022/01/19，《客观评价习近平》，留园网。–2022-02-11
  15. Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. W. (2008). Ch5 in The economics of growth. MIT press. --2022-02-20
  16. Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. W. (2008). Ch12 in The economics of growth. MIT press. --2022-02-21
  17. Groth, C. Barro-Style Regression. --2022-02
  18. Kunieda, T., & Nishimura, K. (2018). Finance and economic growth in a dynamic game. Dynamic Games and Applications, 8(3), 588-600. --2022-03-14
  19. Sandomirskiy, Fedor. Methods of Optimal Transportation in Bayesian Persuasion & Auctions. --2022-03-25
  20. ARIELI, Itai, et al. Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2021, 19.1: 21-29. --2020-03-26
  21. Morris, Stephen. No Trade and Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. Working Paper. 2022-03-20
  22. Grasmair, Markus. Basic Properties of Convex Functions. --2022-04-07
  23. Rust, Dan. QEM “Optimization”, WS 2016/17 Part 3. Convexity. --2022-04-07
  24. EGOROV, Georgy; SONIN, Konstantin. The political economics of non-democracy. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020. --2022-04-19
  25. Wittman, Donald. Appendix Mathematical Background. --2022-04-21
  26. Piette Cédric. Micro 01. --2022-04-21
  27. GUERRAGGIO, Angelo; MOLHO, Elena. The origins of quasi-concavity: a development between mathematics and economics. Historia Mathematica, 2004, 31.1: 62-75. --2022-04-24
  28. ATOLIA, Manoj; CHATTERJEE, Santanu; TURNOVSKY, Stephen J. Growth and inequality: Dependence on the time path of productivity increases (and other structural changes). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2012, 36.3: 331-348. --2022-05-03
  29. HERNÁNDEZ, Alejandro. The dynamics of competitive equilibrium allocations with borrowing constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 55.1: 180-191. --2022-05-04
  30. KHIEU, Hoang; VAN NGUYEN, Tien. Progressive consumption tax, minimum consumption, and inequality. Economics Letters, 2020, 197: 109653. --2022-05-15
  31. 李慎之. 风雨苍黄五十年. -2022-05-18
  32. 吴思. 恶政是一面筛子. --2022-05-19
  33. 李志文. 漫谈二流大学. --2022-05-19
  34. 郭锐. 不得不为恶的政治. --2022-05-19
  35. 萧雪慧. 历史还在忍辱含垢. --2022-05-19
  36. 林达. 独特的高华. --2022-05-19
  37. 胡果威. 面试的诀窍. --2022-05-19
  38. 何清涟. 中国的反精英情绪从何而来? --2022-05-19
  39. 查建英. 國家公僕——王蒙是改革者還是辯護士？ --2022-05-20
  40. Sun Xiang. Lecture Notes: Micro III Ch10-12. --2022-05-24
  41. Weitzman, M. L. (2000). An ‘economics proof’of the supporting hyperplane theorem. Economics Letters, 68(1), 1-6. --2022-05-29
  42. Sobel, J. (2009). Signaling games. Encyclopedia of complexity and systems science, 19, 8125-8139. --2022-06-05
  43. Little, A. T. (2022). Bayesian Explanations for Persuasion. --2022-06-05
  44. Nima Haghpanah, 543:Game Theoy Week 7. --2022-06-13
  45. John Riley. Technical note on CRS production functions. --2022-06-13
  46. Kim Boder. “Production and Returns to Scale” in EC121a. --2022-06-13
  47. Gehlbach Scotton. “Non-democracy” in “Formal Models in Domestic Politics” (Edition 2). --2022-06-15
  48. Carroll, Christopher. Consumption Functions and the Permenant Income Hypothesis. --2022-06-16
  49. Carroll, Christopher. Durables. --2022-06-16
  50. Carroll, Christopher. Consumption Models with Habit Formation. --2022-06-16
  51. Kofman, F., & Lawarree, J. (1996). A prisoner’s dilemma model of collusion deterrence. Journal of Public Economics, 59(1), 117-136. --2022-06-17
  52. Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2021). Institutional change and institutional persistence. In The Handbook of Historical Economics (pp. 365-389). Academic Press. --2022-06-18
  53. Gitmez, A. A., & Sonin, K. (2022). The Dictator’s Dilemma: A Theory of Propaganda and Repression. --2022-06-19
  54. Per Krusell, Ch9 in "Real Macroeconomic Theory
    " --2022-06-19
  55. Per Krusell, Ch12-14 in "Real Macroeconomic Theory
    " --2022-06-22
  56. Kim Boder. “Private Information and Trade: An Introduction” --2022-06-23
  57. Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T., & Robinson, J. A. (2004). Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2-3), 162-192. --2022-06-26
  58. SOBEL, Joel. Giving and receiving advice. Advances in economics and econometrics, 2013, 1: 305-341. --2022-07-04
  59. Levin, Jonathan & Rangel, Antonio. Useful Math for Microeconomics. --2022-07-14
  60. Lin, X., & Liu, C. (2022). Credible Persuasion. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.03495. --2022-08-02
  61. Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E. (2014). Costly persuasion. American Economic Review, 104(5), 457-62. --2022-08-02
  62. Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E. (2017). Disclosure of endogenous information. Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(1), 47-56. --2022-08-03
  63. Luo, Z., & Rozenas, A. (2022). Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Authoritarian Power-Sharing. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. --2022-08-06
  64. Kosenko, A. (2021). Constrained Persuasion with Private Information. --2022-08-09
  65. Kosenko, A. (2021). Algebraic Properties of Blackwell’s Order and A Cardinal Measure of Informativeness. arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.11399 --2022-08-11
  66. de Oliveira, H. (2018). Blackwell’s informativeness theorem using diagrams. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 126-131. --2022-08-12
  67. Fedor Sandomirskiy. Lecture Notes Ch18. --2022-08-12
  68. Crémer, J. (1982). A simple proof of Blackwell’s “comparison of experiments” theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 439-443. --2022-08-17

2021

  1. Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019). Information design: A unified perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1), 44-95. --202104
  2. Tsakas, E., Tsakas, N., & Xefteris, D. (2021). Resisting persuasion. Economic Theory, 1-20. --202104
  3. Aumann, R. (1987). Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality. Econometrica, 55(1), 1-18. doi:10.2307/1911154 Add to Citavi project by DOI --202104
  4. Myerson, R. B. (1982). Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems. Journal of mathematical economics, 10(1), 67-81 --20210419
  5. Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1), 58-73. --20210420
  6. Milgrom, P. R. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. The Bell Journal of Economics, 380-391. --20210421
  7. Myerson, R. B. (1986). Multistage games with communication. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 323-358. --20210508
  8. Salcedo, B. (2017). Interdependent choices. Working Paper. --20210508
  9. Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2021). Bayesian persuasion with costly messages. Journal of Economic Theory, 193, 105212. --20210515
  10. Myerson, R. B. (1994). Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2, 827-847. --20210516
  11. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. journal of Economic Theory, 53(2), 236-260. --20210517
    3(2), 236-260. --20210517
  12. González-Díaz, J., & Meléndez-Jiménez, M. A. (2014). On the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium. Top, 22(1), 128-143. --20210520
  13. Pearce, D. G. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1029-1050. --20210524
  14. Taneva, I. (2019). Information design. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(4), 151-85. --20210527
  15. Jackson, M. O. (1991). Bayesian implementation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 461-477. --20210530
  16. Battigalli, P. (1997). On rationalizability in extensive games. Journal of Economic Theory, 74(1), 40-61. --20210530
  17. Koessler, F., & Skreta, V. (2021). Information Design by an Informed Designer. --20210606
  18. Myerson, R. B. (1983). Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1767-1797. --20210608
  19. Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E. (2016). A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 106(5), 597-601.–20210611
  20. Hennigs, R. (2019). Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion. --20210612
  21. Makris, M., & Renou, L. (2021). Information design in multi-stage games. arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.13482. --20210613
  22. Alonso, R., & Câmara, O. (2016). Persuading voters. American Economic Review, 106(11), 3590-3605. --20210614
  23. Krähmer, D. (2021). Information Design and Strategic Communication. American Economic Review: Insights, 3(1), 51-66. --20210615
  24. Gitmez, A., & Molavi, P. (2018). Media capture: A bayesian persuasion approach. --20210616
  25. Forges, F. (2020). Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion. Annals of Economics and Statistics, (137), 3-30. --20210623
  26. Borgers, Tillman. Lecture Notes on Game Theory. --20210626
  27. FORGES, Françoise. Correlated equilibria and communication in games. Complex Social and Behavioral Systems: Game Theory and Agent-Based Models, 2020, 107-118. --20210628
  28. LEVHARI, David; MIRMAN, Leonard J. The great fish war: an example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, 322-334. --20210701
  29. Moll, Benjamin. Viscosity Solutions for Dummies. --20210701
  30. FORNI, Lorenzo. Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2005, 8.1: 178-194. --20210702
  31. BERNHEIM, B. Douglas; RAY, Debraj. Markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 47.1: 195-202. --20210702
  32. MILGROM, Paul; STOKEY, Nancy. Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal of economic theory, 1982, 26.1: 17-27. --20210703
  33. LUO, Zhaotian; ROZENAS, Arturas. A Unified Model of Information Manipulation. 2018. --20210706
  34. DUTTA, Prajit K.; RADNER, Roy. Moral hazard. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1994, 2: 869-903. --20210708
  35. KREPS, David M.; SOBEL, Joel. Signalling. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1994, 2: 849-867. --20210708
  36. VASAL, Deepanshu. Dynamic information design. Available at SSRN 3597020, 2020. --20210709
  37. KRAWCZYK, Jacek B.; PETKOV, Vladimir. Multistage games. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 2018, 157-213. --20210720
  38. SCHWARZ, Gideon. Game theory and statistics. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1994, 2: 769-779. --20210720
  39. ROEMER, John E. Kantian equilibrium. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010, 112.1: 1-24. --20210721
  40. KRAWCZYK, Jacek B.; SHIMOMURA, Koji. Why countries with the same technology and preferences can have different growth rates. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2003, 27.10: 1899-1916. --20210721
  41. JACKSON, Matthew O. A crash course in implementation theory. Social choice and welfare, 2001, 18.4: 655-708. --20210726
  42. PALFREY, Thomas R. Implementation theory. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2002, 3: 2271-2326. --20210728
  43. FARRELL, Joseph; RABIN, Matthew. Cheap talk. Journal of Economic perspectives, 1996, 10.3: 103-118. --20210729
  44. MOORE, John; REPULLO, Rafael. Nash implementation: a full characterization. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990, 1083-1099. --20210803
  45. GANGULY, Chirantan; RAY, Indrajit. Cheap talk: Basic models and new developments. Mimeo, February, 2006. --20210805
  46. FLEURBAEY, Marc. Economic theories of justice. Annual Review of Economics, 2019, 11: 665-684. --20210819
  47. BENHABIB, Jess; RUSTICHINI, Aldo. Social conflict and growth. Journal of economic growth, 1996, 1.1: 125-142. --20210819
  48. SAREVER, Todd. Microeconomic Theory Notes. 2020 Version. --20210824
  49. CAI, Hongbin; WENG, Xi. Moral Hazard: Dynamic Models.2014. --20210825
  50. SAREVER, Todd. Microeconomic Theory Notes. 2021 Version. --20210826
  51. Välimäki, Juuso. Lecture Notes in Information Economics. 2014 Version. --20210826
  52. FORGES, Francoise. An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986, 1375-1385. --20210827
  53. CAI, Hongbin; WENG, Xi. A Preliminary Introduction to Mechanism Design Theory. --20210831
  54. WEI, Dong. Persuasion under costly learning. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021, 94: 102451. --20210903
  55. TADELIS; Segal. Lectures in Contract Theory. --20210916
  56. Kamenica, Emir, Kyungmin Kim, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk. “Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues.” (2021): 1-4. --20210924
  57. BAKER, Christian. Cheap Talk with Costly Outside Information. 2020. --20210927
  58. Raphael Boleslavsky. Lecture Notes on Strategic Communication. --20211008
  59. BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil; HIRSHLEIFER, David A.; WELCH, Ivo. Information Cascades; Entry Written for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Entry Written for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (September 6, 2005), 2005. --20211017
  60. EASLEY and KLEINBERG. Ch8 of Networks, Crowds and Markets. Cambridge University Press. 2010 --20211018
  61. KOMIYA, Hidetoshi. Inverse of the Berge maximum theorem. Economic Theory, 1997, 9.2: 371-375. --20211019
  62. YU, Jian; WANG, Neng-Fa; YANG, Zhe. Equivalence results between Nash equilibrium theorem and some fixed point theorems. Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 2016, 2016.1: 1-10. 其中 Nash 与 KKM 的等价性没看懂，具体是 max d(x,Fi)=0 这一段 --20211019
  63. EASLEY and KLEINBERG. Ch16 of Networks, Crowds and Markets. Cambridge University Press. 2010 --20211018
  64. CAPUTO, Michael R. The comparative dynamics of closed-loop controls for discounted infinite horizon optimal control problems. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2003, 27.8: 1335-1365. --20211027
  65. CAPUTO, Michael R. New insights in the canonical model of health capital. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, 110: 23-33. --20211029
  66. SILBERBERG, Eugene. A revision of comparative statics methodology in economics, or, how to do comparative statics on the back of an envelope. Journal of Economic Theory, 1974, 7.2: 159-172. --20211101
  67. LOHMANN, Susanne. Information aggregation through costly political action. The American Economic Review, 1994, 518-530. --20211102
  68. GALAMA, Titus J.; VAN KIPPERSLUIS, Hans. Health inequalities through the lens of health-capital theory: issues, solutions, and future directions. In: Health and inequality. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013. --20211104
  69. EISENRING, Christoph. Comparative dynamics in a health investment model. Journal of health economics, 1999, 18.5: 655-660. --20211104
  70. GONG, Liutang; WANG, Wei. A general method for comparative dynamics in continuous‐time models. Australian Economic Papers, 2020, 59.1: 55-69. --20211107
  71. SUEN, Wing; SILBERBERG, Eugene; TSENG, Paul. The LeChatelier principle: the long and the short of it. Economic Theory, 2000, 16.2: 471-476. --20211107
  72. SILBERBERG, Eugene. The Theory of the Firm in" Long-Run" Equilibrium. The American Economic Review, 1974, 64.4: 734-741. --20211107
  73. BECKER, Daniel Thomas. A technical note on comparative dynamics in a fiscal competition model. Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory-Working Paper, 2008. --20211120
  74. JUDD, Kenneth L. An alternative to steady-state comparisons in perfect foresight models. Economics Letters, 1982, 10.1-2: 55-59. --20211122
  75. Barelli, P./ de Abreu Pessôa, S. (2005): A Generalization of Comparative Dynamics, mimeo. --20211122
  76. BOADWAY, Robin. Long-run tax incidence: A comparative dynamic approach. The Review of Economic Studies, 1979, 46.3: 505-511. --20211122
  77. Brito B. Paulo. The Ramsey and the benchmark DGE models in continuous time. Advanced Macroeconomics: 2021-2022 --20211123
  78. MEIJDAM, Lex; VERHOEVEN, Marijn. Comparative dynamics in perfect-foresight models. Computational Economics, 1998, 12.2: 115-124. --20211123
  79. HREN, Rok, et al. Theoretical shortcomings of the Grossman model. Bulletin: Economics, Organisation and Informatics in Healthcare, 2012, 28.1: 63-75. --20211125
  80. Keister, Todd. Lecture notes on the optimal growth problem. 2005 version. --20211127
  81. Ireland, Peter. Eular equations and trasversality conditions. fall 2021. --20211128
  82. Nimark, Kris. Introduction to information theory. --20211128
  83. Nimark, Kris. Topics in macroeconomics: modelling information, learning and expectations. --20211128
  84. ROTHSCHILD, Michael; STIGLITZ, Joseph E. Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic theory, 1970, 2.3: 225-243. --20211129
  85. DARDANONI, Valentino; WAGSTAFF, Adam. Uncertainty, inequalities in health and the demand for health. Journal of Health Economics, 1987, 6.4: 283-290. --20211130 其中(A2和A3)没看懂。
  86. Makoto, Nakajima. Note on practical dynamic programming. --20211201
  87. Groth, Christian. Review of technology and firms. --20211202
  88. Thompson, Peter. Lectures on differential equations. --20211209
  89. Brito, Paulo. Toolkit for economic growth. 2021-2022 version.(指数型增长对规模报酬不变以及至少两种耐久品、耐久品的定义都没看懂) --20211216
  90. WILDASIN, David E. Fiscal competition in space and time. Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87.11: 2571-2588. --20211221
  91. Border, Kim. C. Introduction to Capital Theory. --20211222
  92. Chu, Augus. From “Ramsey with monopolistic competition” to “Schumpeter” --20211222
  93. Brito, Paulo. Modern growth accounting amd modern growth facts. --20211222 这位老师讲得太清晰了，不是那种千篇一律的教材
  94. Brito, Paulo. From “Simplest” to “Two sector” --20211223
  95. Tsiaras, A. Ch2 of math camp macro. --20211223
  96. Alfonso NovalesEsther FernándezJesús Ruiz. Optimal Growth: Continuous Time Analysis in Economic Growth. --20211225
  97. JONES, Charles I.; SCRIMGEOUR, Dean. The steady-state growth theorem: Understanding uzawa (1961). August, 2005, 16: 2005. --20211227
  98. GROTH, Christian. Ch14 Fixed Capital investment and Tobin’s Q. --20211227
  99. GROTH, Christian. Balanced growth theorems. --20211228
  100. Mert, Merter, On Returns to Scale Assumption in Endogenous Growth (2016). International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR), Vol. 25(3), pp. 368-379, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2794375 --20211229
  101. SCHLICHT, Ekkehart. A variant of Uzawa’s theorem. Munich Discussion Paper, 2006. --20211229

特別

  1. Sterken, Elmer (2004). How to Write An Economics Paper? --20200312
  2. Varian, H. R. (2016). How to build an economic model in your spare time. The American Economist, 61(1), 81-90. --20200313 從生活中找靈感、晚些看文獻、反芻、晾一會兒、KISS、先簡化再簡化然後一般化、修改（版本）管理係統、引用管理係統。
  3. Dixit, A. Some Notes on the Art of Theoretical Modeling. --20200313 簡單、簡單、簡單。推薦了幾篇優秀的模型和經濟學家的採訪。
  4. “How to get started on research in economics?” Steve Pischke, A few ideas mostly for empirical work --20200316 for empirical work 別讀太多、別聽太多課、別拖延、持續幹活、事先構想可能的提問及回答。
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel. “10 Q&A: Experienced Advice for ‘Lost’ Graduate Students in Economics.” The Journal of Economic Education 44, no. 3 (July 2013): 193–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2013.795448. --20200425
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel. “Comments on Economic Models, Economics, and Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by Dani Rodrik.” Journal of Economic Literature 55, no. 1 (March 2017): 162–72. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20161408. --20200425
  7. Deconinck, Koen. “Trust Me, I’m a Doctor: A PhD Survival Guide.” Journal of Economic Education 46, no. 4 (2015): 360–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2015.1071223.
  8. Schwartz, Martin A. “The Importance of Stupidity in Scientific Research.” Journal of Cell Science, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1242/jcs.033340.
  9. ATHEY. Prefessional Advices. https://athey.people.stanford.edu/professional-advice.

視訊

  1. JuliaCon 2016 (Keynote) | Quantitative Macroeconomics in Julia | Nobel Laureate Tom Sargent. Accessed April 25, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkKBwJkYgVk&t=152s.
  2. “Eric Maskin - Dynamic Oligopoly and Markov Perfect Equilibrium - YouTube.” Accessed April 25, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxA1-563NHc&t=2s.
  3. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals - Eric Maskin. Accessed April 27, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FISDfqvWhxU.
  4. Eric Maskin , “Markov Equilibrium” (Joint with Jean Tirole). Accessed May 2, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNtLnKJzrhs&t=88s.
  5. Emir Kamenica - Persuasion vs. Incentives. Accessed May 3, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3pccR-dumw&t=711s.
  6. UCLA POLISCI30.

2019

  1. Blanchard, O., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia. IMF staff papers, 48(1), 171-179.
  2. Francesconi, M., Ghiglino, C., & Perry, M. (2016). An evolutionary theory of monogamy. Journal of Economic Theory, 166, 605-628. （不包括 Appendix）
  3. Pešić, R., & Boričić, B. (2004). The Political Economy of Post-Communist Autocracy: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy. European Political Economy Review, 2(1), 36-50.
  4. Kongsamut, P., Rebelo, S., & Xie, D. (2001). Beyond balanced growth.The Review of Economic Studies,68(4), 869-882.（Published Version）
  5. Lovell, M. C. (2008). A simple proof of the FWL theorem. The Journal of Economic Education, 39(1), 88-91.
  6. Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., & Svolik, M. W. (2016). Formal models of nondemocratic politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 19, 565-584.
  7. Burbank, S. B., & Friedman, B. (2002). Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who Cares? in Judicial independence at the crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach. Sage.
  8. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American economic review, 35(4), 519-530.
  9. Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American political science review, 87(3), 567-576.
  10. Haber, S. (2006). Authoritarian government. In The Oxford handbook of political economy.
  11. Nathan, A. J. (2017). A factionalism model for CCP politics. In Critical Readings on Communist Party of China (pp. 849-886). BRILL.
  12. Wintrobe, R. (1990). The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship. American political science review, 84(3), 849-872.
  13. Shih, V. C., & Lee, J. (2016). Are factions self-enforcing contracts: identifying the impact of patrons’ exit on the careers of clients. Working paper at the Univ. of California San Diego. https://gps. ucsd. edu/_files/faculty/shih/Shih_Lee_factions_enforceable_merged_draft16_9. pdf.
  14. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91(4), 938-963. --20191006
  15. Lazarev, V. (2007). Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(3), 546-563. （Published Version）–20191007
  16. Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D., & Vindigni, A. (2010). A theory of military dictatorships. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1), 1-42. （不包括 Online Appendix）–20191009
  17. Dragu, T., & Przeworski, A. (2019). Preventive repression: Two types of moral hazard. American Political Science Review, 113(1), 77-87. （不包括 Online Appendix）–20191012
  18. Ngai, L. R., & Pissarides, C. A. (2007). Structural change in a multisector model of growth. American economic review, 97(1), 429-443.
  19. Wang, P. (2012). Understanding Expectation‐Driven Fluctuations: A Labor‐Market Approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(2‐3), 487-506. --20191201
  20. Durlauf, Steven N. (2018). Institutions, Development and Growth: Where Does Evidence Stand? EDI Working Paper. --20191209
  21. Lorentzen, P. (2014). China’s strategic censorship. American Journal of Political Science, 58(2), 402-414. --20191218

2020

  1. Gollin, D., Parente, S., & Rogerson, R. (2002). The role of agriculture in development. American economic review, 92(2), 160-164.
    國家間有差異農業技術進步速度是決定步入工業化階段時點差別和國家間收入差距的重要差距。兩部門（農業/非農業）；Stone-Geary效用函數。特點：收斂到穩態的速度很慢，以百年記。缺點：古早農業/現代農業的生産技術轉型是Ad-hoc的，並未刻畫出農業生産技術的內生轉型。–20200104
  2. 許誌偉,劉建豐.收入不確定性、資産配置與貨幣政策選擇[J].經濟研究,2019,54(05):30-46.–20200104
  3. Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra‐industry reallocations and aggregate industry econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725. --20200105
  4. Hare, R. (1982). Ethical theory and utilitarianism. In A. Sen & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (pp. 23-38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611964.003 --20200229
  5. Matsuyama, K. (2009). Structural change in an interdependent world: A global view of manufacturing decline. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 478-486. --20200302
  6. Villemot, S. (2011). Solving rational expectations models at first order: what Dynare does (No. 2). CEPREMAP. --20200302
  7. Ghiglino, C. (2002). Introduction to a general equilibrium approach to economic growth. Journal of Economic Theory, 105(1), 1-17. --20200305 主要關註內生增長理論和發錶在JET的文章，有很多非常規的內容，提到了很多次（跟許誌偉有合作的）B老師，Farmer老師等等。提到了一篇文章，發現“在長期增長問題中內生化勞動供給的經驗必要性”。
  8. Acemoglu, D. (2012). Introduction to economic growth. Journal of economic theory, 147(2), 545-550. --20200305
  9. Villamil, A. P. (2003). Introduction to capital accumulation and allocation in economic growth. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43(4), 583-591. --20200305
  10. Laitner, J. (2000). Structural change and economic growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), 545-561. --20200306 兩部門：使用土地和勞動的農業部門；使用勞動一比一轉換為資本並一比一轉換為産出的工業部門。效用函數設定刻畫了消費的Engle’s Law。儲蓄率定義：因土地價格上漲而帶來的gain不算做儲蓄。居民為OLG，年輕勞動不消費，年老消費不勞動。結果：工業化引起儲蓄率上升。截麵證據中收入與儲蓄率的反方嚮變化可能來自於國際貿易：初始時土地稀少的窮國，受比較優勢作用較早開始工業品生産。
  11. Alonso-Carrera, J., & Raurich, X. (2015). Demand-based structural change and balanced economic growth. Journal of Macroeco
  • 標題: 文獻閱讀
  • 作者: Brandon Song Li
  • 撰寫于 : 2019-10-06 21:40:00
  • 更新于 : 2023-08-28 23:00:03
  • 連結: https://brandonsli.com/p/0a743s09.html
  • 版權宣告: 保留所有權利 © (Brandon) Song Li
目錄
文獻閱讀
  1. 2023
  2. 2022
  3. 2021
  4. 特別
  5. 視訊
  6. 2019
  7. 2020